· The second point concerns _self-reference_ (reflexiveness). The model contains a submodel of State instruments. Clarity requires that policy itself is clearly formulated and put into the model too (with error terms to allow for possible discretion). · The third point is _conflictive self-reference_. One can conceive the situation that the government announces a policy while the true scientific forecast shows that the policy is untenable and will be repealed later. Hence there is an internal source of conflict - the worst kind, not a dysfunctional person, but a logical knot. · Finally, there is a ‘general conflict of interests’. Governments have more objectives, and any power group might want to exert its influence anyway. It follows from this that the Constitution should warrant for the Economic Supreme Court: · It would be possible for the Court to use a model with an endogenous government. The Court would scientifically forecast government actions, instead of _conditionally_. The conditional forecast assumption that government promises will be kept and government assumptions realised, will be dropped. · As the Court will have a scientific base, there can be publications and discussions with different analyses, and these would not by themselves mean a breach of confidentiality. · The Court cannot exist without some power. It would suffice for the Court to have the power to veto the national budget if the information that the Executive presents or uses for the budget is scientifically incorrect (in the judgement of the Court). The information and statistics only. The Court will focus on the statement on the deficit and the national debt, since all errors accumulate in those figures - though it can call any number or piece of economic information into question. Parliament of course keeps the power to decide on the budget and on policy. President and Parliament would lose the power to make misleading statements as judged by the Court. An appendix contains a draft constitutional amendment as an example, to start thinking about it. The appendices also contain a description of the current US Council of Economic Advisers, and the difference should be clear - e.g. where the CEA appears to have no scientific status. With an Economic Supreme Court in place, a downside is that a nation could get stuck in a specific economic theory. A Court could believe in Monetarism while reality would require something differently. Indeed, Keynes himself addressed his _General Theory_ to his fellow economists, who were as conservative as politicians in rejecting his proposals about fighting the Great Depression. To answer this: Such stagnation in policy making can happen nowadays too, but the situation with a Court is much more transparant. Also, the very job of the Court requires it to pay attention to the data, and this tends to make for eclectic views. 7. Position of the Court in economic theory