Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920Crowell, Benedict
History
Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920
Crowell, Benedict
United States. Army. American Expeditionary Forces -- Demobilization; World War, 1914-1918 -- United States
As to the A. E. F.’s own 65,000 tons of loaded shell, it was decided
to destroy all gas shell and all explosive shell and cartridges loaded
with explosives of doubtful stability and to return the rest to the
United States. The work of shipping the serviceable ammunition home
actually started, but it went on slowly because of the lack both of
labor and of ammunition ships. A fire destroyed one of the three
collection dumps in the Château-Thierry area. As the ships repatriated
the A. E. F. at a faster and faster rate, the various army areas were
evacuated one by one, but it was necessary to leave guards behind at
the various ammunition dumps. Then the War Department began studying
the problem with a practical eye. Nearly all this ammunition was
“war quality”: good enough for rapid consumption on the field, but
made hurriedly by inexperienced labor under conditions that made its
permanent stability questionable. It was found to be impossible to
separate the better ammunition from that of doubtful stability. It was
conceded that under ideal conditions this ammunition might be stored
safely for five years. Some of it had already been stored for eighteen
months; it would take at least a year to transport it all to the United
States; and therefore in this country it would be good for only a
brief time. Accordingly the A. E. F. authorities negotiated with the
French to assume liability for the ammunition, and it all went into
the general settlement of 1919 with the French, but as an American
liability reducing the financial liability of the French under the
agreement.
The chief permanent benefits accruing to the United States from its
extensive war industry engaged in the manufacture of instruments for
sighting and controlling the fire of field guns were (1) a reserve
of optical instruments of the most advanced types, some of which had
previously been produced only by the French, (2) a large collection of
machinery for making these and similar instruments, and (3) an optical
glass industry more than sufficient to the normal needs of the country.
Before 1914 little, if any, optical glass had been produced in the
United States. In demobilizing this industry, the Ordnance Department
took care that all these military assets were properly fitted into the
preparedness plan.
Again we see at work the policy of centering future production in
an arsenal. Frankford Arsenal was designated as the military center
for fire-control instruments, and here were brought the reserves of
materials and tools acquired by the Government in the course of the
enterprise.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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