Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920Crowell, Benedict
History
Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920
Crowell, Benedict
United States. Army. American Expeditionary Forces -- Demobilization; World War, 1914-1918 -- United States
It is impossible here even to give an estimate of the value of the
surplus materials left on the hands of the War Department after the
termination of the war industry, for the reason that the War Department
itself has never been able to arrive at an estimate. The subject has
been so vast, so intricate, and so complicated by the changing of
_personnel_ and the evolution of organization, that it has seemed to be
a hopeless task to attempt an inventory of the surplus property sold
and for sale. We can, however, gain some idea of the quantities of
it. It is estimated that the armistice found the Army with a surplus
of war supplies on hand of a value of $2,000,000,000. This investment
represented goods actually produced by American industry up to November
11, 1918, in the maintenance of a force of 4,000,000 men and in
anticipation of a force of nearly 5,000,000 in 1919. But this, mind
you, was surplus within the United States. On the same date--the day
of the armistice--the A. E. F., through importations from the United
States and through its own foreign purchases, had built up a surplus
of supplies worth $1,330,000,000 over and above what it would return
to the war reserves at home and outside of what it would consume while
resting on European soil during demobilization. Thus we have the figure
$3,330,000,000 as representing the value of the surplus supplies,
munitions, on hand when the active fighting ceased.
But this is only the beginning of the complete inventory; this was
merely the surplus existing on November 11, 1918. War industry, under
the policy of terminating it by graduating a declining production,
still had weeks and months to go on producing goods, for most of which
there was no war use. This dwindling manufacture by thousands of
factories with millions of employees added to the surpluses materials
worth many hundreds of millions. And still the tale is not told. War
industry had been fostered by huge federal investments in buildings and
machinery. These facilities, too, existed as surplus when the industry
ended. This great accumulation was largely augmented by the machinery
and other manufacturing facilities taken over by the Government in
the settlement with the war contractors. The Government had purchased
heavily of raw materials of various sorts, quantities of which remained
as surplus after the armistice. In liquidating the war industry it
added further to its stores of raw materials and took over, besides,
a great mass of semi-finished materials in all stages of completion.
When upon this heap we pile a great part of all the war building
construction, and on that the additional surpluses automatically
created when polity in Congress and in the executive offices made cut
after cut in the size of the permanent Army, then we are approximating
the total of the surplus.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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