Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920Crowell, Benedict
History
Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920
Crowell, Benedict
United States. Army. American Expeditionary Forces -- Demobilization; World War, 1914-1918 -- United States
This was all wealth, the true substance of the nation, its resources
fabricated by its labor for the special purposes of war; and, with the
war over, with little or no demand or use for these special materials,
they could be disposed of only at a shocking sacrifice. Again, we
cannot estimate the extent of the shrinkage, but we can indicate
it. Up to March 1, 1920, the War Department had disposed of surplus
property which had cost it $2,600,000,000. For this it had received
$1,633,000,000. The recovery, therefore, was 64 per cent of the cost;
the loss, 36 per cent. The shrinkage in values is one of the wastes
which any nation must contemplate and accept when it sets forth to wage
war on the modern scale. The nation can get value received for the cost
of its munitions only by using them in war.
The largest of American companies, the United States Steel Corporation,
in 1918, its busiest year, did a gross business of $1,745,000,000. The
value of the surplus munitions produced before the armistice was nearly
twice as great as that. The Steel Corporation, however, produced only
a few dozen or few score sorts of products. The sorts of goods and
materials to be disposed of by the Sales Branch were in number about
250,000, and this range embraced goods known in many branches of trade.
The Steel Corporation and other great companies usually sell to a
relatively small group of customers, who take the products in wholesale
quantities. The market which the Sales Branch entered consisted of the
entire United States, with 110,000,000 possible buyers; for part of
the problem was to dispose of surplus materials by retail sale to the
public. All in all, this may be regarded as the greatest merchandizing
enterprise ever undertaken in America.
The 250,000 catalogue items in the sales list were divided roughly into
seven commodity groups, as follows: (1) railway and building materials
and contractors’ equipment; (2) manufacturing plants and plant sites;
(3) machine tools; (4) vehicles and airplanes, including spare engines
and parts; (5) quartermaster stores; (6) ordnance and technical
equipment, including office equipment; and (7) raw materials, scrap
metal, and waste materials.
It was recognized at the outset that to throw on the market vast
quantities of supplies and materials in all these seven categories was
to court disaster to the industrial situation. Business and industry
immediately after the armistice were in a ticklish position. They faced
the complete transition from the war to the peace basis, an uncharted
region through which it seemed likely that they could go safely only
under the wisest of guidance. If, in addition to its inevitable
troubles of reconstruction, industry were to have to face cutthroat
competition with the surpluses of the very goods its own mills had
created during the war, it was evident that the difficulties of the
transition might be doubled.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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