Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920Crowell, Benedict
History
Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920
Crowell, Benedict
United States. Army. American Expeditionary Forces -- Demobilization; World War, 1914-1918 -- United States
Mr. Chester W. Cuthell was the Special Representative of the Secretary
of War. His Board consisted of lawyers and accountants whom he chose
and appointed. The duties of Mr. Cuthell and his Board were to
terminate and settle up the war business of the Allies in the United
States under those arrangements in which the War Department had been
a participant, whether as agent, producer, or partner. The Board was
therefore essentially the agency for liquidating the international
business on this side of the Atlantic. The United States Liquidation
Commission, on the other hand, was the agency created to liquidate
America’s war industry abroad; and this was much the greater of the
two tasks. The United States Liquidation Commission was charged, also,
with an added duty: that of disposing of all American surplus military
property on foreign soil.
We must think of both these activities in international demobilization
as going on simultaneously, as they did. The two agencies were created
almost at the same time: Mr. Cuthell was appointed on January 22,
1919, and the United States Liquidation Commission was created on the
following February 11. Also it was necessary that they both work in the
closest contact and coöperation with each other, since the arrangements
of both would have to come together in the final settlements, the
American claims against the Allies, as substantiated by the Board,
going to offset the Allied claims against us, as acknowledged by
the Liquidation Commission. This liaison and harmony existed. The
coöperation, too, extended to the adoption of certain broad policies
which were to be followed by both in liquidating the business. One
of these, and perhaps the most important one, was that, in the
negotiations that were to follow, no nation should expect to profit at
the expense of any of the others. The settlements should be made on the
basis of actual cost. A second policy was that international agreements
and understandings, even though they had never been committed formally
to writing, were to have the binding force of formal contracts. In
other words, the business would be settled as among partners and
friends, no one of whom wished to take advantage of the others.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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