Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920 — John Shaqi
Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920Crowell, Benedict
History
Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920
Crowell, Benedict
United States. Army. American Expeditionary Forces -- Demobilization; World War, 1914-1918 -- United States
With the immense fleet thus assembled the War Department transported
men across the Atlantic with an intense concentration of effort never
before known. First in the determination that the Germans should not
conquer, later in the assurance that we ourselves should win, the
Department shipped the troops over with scarcely a thought of how they
were going to get back again. Future events were to be allowed to take
care of themselves.
Now such events had come to pass. England, faced with the sudden
necessity of returning her own colonial soldiers to their native lands,
and looking ahead, too, to the restoration of her all-important foreign
commerce, immediately withdrew her tonnage from our service. France
and Italy did likewise. The magnificent “bridge of ships” on which the
American Expedition had crossed the Atlantic melted away, and 2,000,000
Americans found themselves partially marooned in a strange land.
[Illustration:
_Photo by Signal Corps_
CASUALS ON TRANSPORT LEAVING BREST]
[Illustration:
_Photo by Signal Corps_
BOARDING TRANSPORT FROM LIGHTERS, BREST]
Yet not completely marooned. The fleet of American-flag troopships
assembled during the war had on the day of the armistice a one-trip
capacity of 112,000 military passengers. Operated in armed and
guarded convoys, this shipping could not quite average one round-trip
transatlantic voyage a month; its transporting capacity under war
conditions was somewhere in the neighborhood of 100,000 troops a month.
The armistice did away with the need of steaming in convoy and allowed
the transports to be operated by the much more efficient system of
individual sailings. Under such conditions the monthly capacity of the
American-flag fleet was about 150,000 men. This capacity was to be
discounted somewhat by the fact that practically all of the vessels had
reached a point of having to be retired for a season of reconditioning
and repair. It was evident that, unless this fleet were aided, it would
take it, under the most favorable conditions, over a year to bring home
the A. E. F.; and it was likelier that, actually, the spring of 1920
would be at hand before the last of the overseas soldiers set foot once
more on their native soil. General Hines’s plan provided for such aid.
It discounted in advance the subsequent fact that the Allies withdrew
their passenger ships, and turned to our own resources for increased
transport capacity.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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