43. Præmittendum 5º, nullam inveniri repugnantiam, nec in Philosophia, nec in Theologia; quod dari possint creaturæ rationales constantes spiritu et corpore, aliæ ab homine, quia si esset repugnantia, hoc esset vel ex parte Dei (et hoc non quia ipse omnipotens est), vel ex parte rei creabilis; et neque hoc, quia sicut creatura mere spiritualis, ut Angeli, creata est, et mere materialis, ut Mundus, et partim spiritualis, partim corporea, corporeitate terrestri, et crassa, ut homo, ita creabilis est creatura constans spiritu rationali, et corporeitate minus crassa, sed subtiliore, quam sit homo. Et profecto post Resurrectionem anima Beatorum erit unita corpori glorioso dote subtilitatis donato: ut proinde concludi posset, potuisse Deum creare creaturam rationalem corpoream, cui naturaliter indita sit corporis subtilitas, sicut per gratiam corpori glorioso confertur. 43. Fifthly, I premise that neither Philosophy nor Theology is repugnant to the possible existence of rational creatures having spirit and body and distinct from man. Such repugnance could be supported only on God, and that is inadmissible, since he is all-mighty, or on the thing to be made, and that likewise cannot be supported; for, as there are purely spiritual creatures, such as Angels, or merely material, such as the World, or lastly semi-spiritual and semi-corporeal, of an earthly and gross corporeity, such as man, so there may well be in existence a creature endowed with a rational spirit and a corporeity less gross, more subtile than man’s. No doubt, moreover, but that after Resurrection, the souls of the blessed will be united with a glorious and subtile body; from which may be inferred that God may well have made a rational and corporeal creature whose body naturally enjoys the subtilty which will be conferred by the grace on the glorious body. 44. Astruitur autem magis talium creaturarum possibilitas ex solutione argumentorum, quæ contra positam conclusionem fieri possunt, pariterque ex responsione ad interrogationes, quæ possunt circa eam formari. 44. But, the possible existence of such creatures will be still better set forth by solving the arguments which can be adduced against our conclusion, and replying to the questions it may raise. 45. Prima interrogatio est, an tales creaturæ dicendæ essent animalia rationalia? Quod si sic, quomodo different ab homine, cum quo communem haberent definitionem? 45. First question: should such creatures be styled rational animals? And if so, in what do they differ from man, with whom they would have that definition in common?