An obvious influence is, in one respect, the same as that which enriches the plutocrat and prompts the politician to reach for power--self-interest. When all the members of any body of men find themselves in equal relation to a profitable end in which they solely are concerned, they will surely be inclined to assert their joint independence of other bodies in that respect, and, further, each member will claim his full share of whatever benefits arise. But, more than that; something like equality of benefits being achieved, perhaps through various agencies of force, a second influence will be brought powerfully to bear on those concerned. It is that of justice. Fair play to all the members will be generally demanded. In a pure democracy, therefore, intelligently controlled self-interest and a consequent sentiment of justice are the sources in which the highest possible social benefits may be expected to begin. The reader has now before him the political principle to be here maintained--pure democracy as distinguished from representative government. My argument, then, becomes this: To show that, by means of the one lawmaking method to which pure democracy is restricted,--that of direct legislation by the citizenship,--the political "ring," "boss," and "heeler" may be abolished, the American plutocracy destroyed, and government simplified and reduced to the limits set by the conscience of the majority as affected by social necessities. My task involves proof that direct legislation is possible with large communities. _Direct Legislation in Switzerland._ Evidence as to the practicability and the effects of direct legislation is afforded by Switzerland, especially in its history during the past twenty-five years. To this evidence I turn at once. There are in Switzerland twenty-two cantons (states), which are subdivided into 2,706 communes (townships). The commune is the political as well as territorial unit. Commonly, as nearly as consistent with cantonal and federal rights, in local affairs the commune governs itself. Its citizens regard it as their smaller state. It is jealous of interference by the greater state. It has its own property to look after. Until the interests of the canton or the Confederation manifestly replace those of the immediate locality, the commune declines to part with the administration of its lands, forests, police, roads, schools, churches, or taxes.