XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute Soldiers XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not to observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity in a City is most hurtful to the Governor XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at first to escape injury, and then to injure others XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in particulars they judge truly XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or wicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good XLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom, have had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their freedom, Cities which at the first have been in subjection will find this almost impossible L. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the Government of a City to a stay LI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done by choice LII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a State, there is no safer method, nor less open to objection, than to forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to advance himself LIII. That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often desire what would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave promises easily move them LIV. Of the boundless authority which a great man may use to restrain an excited Multitude LV. That the Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible where equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not LVI. That when great calamities are about to befall a City or Country, signs are seen to presage, and seers arise who foretell them LVII. That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak LVIII. That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince LIX. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust, whether those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes LX. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were given without respect to Age BOOK II. PREFACE I. Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or to Fortune II. With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these were in defending their Freedom III. That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round about her, and by readily admitting Strangers to the rights of Citizenship IV. That Commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their power V. That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and Pestilences, obliterate the memory of the past