“It is the will of France that can alone restore Rome to the Italians. It is the sword of France, if any sword can do it, that alone can free Venetia from the Austrians.” But in a long and splendid speech he urged, almost prophetically, that by forcing the French Emperor to a policy which he was unwilling to pursue, we should eventually give him a dangerous preponderance: “... It will be in his power ... to make those greater changes and _aim at those greater results which I will only intimate and not attempt to describe_.” In 1864, on the Danish crisis, advocating firmness of action following on firmness of statement, he once more repeated: “... If there is, under these circumstances, a cordial alliance between England and France, war is most difficult; but if there is a thorough understanding between England, France, and Russia, war is impossible.” Though here, again, this consideration would not deter him from the single object of England’s welfare. Finally, he consulted French sentiment in the delicate arrangement at Berlin. “... There is no step of this kind that I would take without considering the effect it might have upon the feelings of France--a nation to whom we are bound by almost every tie that can unite a people.... We avoided Egypt, knowing how susceptible France is with regard to Egypt; we avoided Syria; ... and we avoided availing ourselves of any part of the _terra firma_, because we would not hurt the feelings or excite the suspicions of France.... But the interests of France ... are, as she acknowledges, sentimental and traditionary interests; and although I respect them, ... we must remember that our connection with the East is not merely an affair of sentiment and tradition, but that we have urgent and substantial and enormous interests which we must guard and keep.”