Slavery, says a well informed writer [Hargrave's case of Negroe Somerset.] on the subject, has been attended with circumstances so various in different countries, as to render it difficult to give a general definition of it. Justinian calls it a constitution of the law of nations, by which one man is made subject to another, contrary to nature [Lib. 1. Tit. 3. Sect. 2.]. Grotius describes it to be an obligation to serve another for life, in consideration of diet, and other common necessaries [Lib. 2. c. 5. Sect. 27]. Dr. Rutherforth, rejecting this definition, informs us, that perfect slavery is an obligation to be directed by another in all one's actions [Lib. 1. c. 20. pa. 474.]. Baron Montesquieu defines it to be the establishment of a right, which gives one man such a power over another, as renders him absolute master over his life and fortune [Lib. 15. c. 1.]. These definitions appear not to embrace the subject fully, since they respect the condition of the slave, in regard to his _master_, only, and not in regard to the _state_, as well as the _master_. The author last mentioned observes, that the constitution of a state may be free, and the subject not so. The subject free, and not the constitution of the state [Lib. 12. c. 1.]. Pursuing this idea, instead of attempting a general definition of slavery; I shall, by considering it under a threefold aspect, endeavour to give a just idea of its nature. I. When a nation is, from any external cause, deprived of the right of being governed by its own laws, only, such a nation may be considered as in a state of _political slavery_. Such is the state of conquered countries, and generally, of colonies, and other dependant governments. Such was the state of united America before the revolution. In this case the personal rights of the subject may be so far secured by wholesome laws, as that the individual may be esteemed free, whilst the state is subject to a higher power: this subjection of one nation, or people, to the will of another, constitutes the first species of slavery, which, in order to distinguish it from the other two, I have called political; inasmuch as it exists only in respect to the governments, and not to the individuals of the two countries. Of this it is not our business to speak, at present.