III. That condition in which one man is subject to be directed by another in all his actions; and this constitutes a state of _domestic slavery_; to which state all the incapacities and disabilities of civil slavery are incident, with the weight of other numerous calamities superadded thereto. And here it may be proper to make a short enquiry into the origin and foundation of domestic slavery in other countries, previous to its fatal introduction into this. [Footnote 6: The Constitution of Virginia, art. 7. declares, that the right of suffrage shall remain as then exercised: the act of 1723, c. 4 (edit. 1733,), sect. 23, declared, that no Negroe, mulattoe, or Indian, shall have any vote at the election of burgesses, or any other election whatsoever.--This act, it is presumed, was in force at the adoption of the constitution.--The act of 1785, c. 55 (edit. of 1794, c. 17,), also expressly excludes them from the right of suffrage.] Slaves, says Justinian, are either born such or become so [Inst. lib. 1. tit. 1.]. They are born slaves when they are children of bond women; and they become slaves, either by the law of nations, that is, by captivity; for it is the practice of our generals to sell their captives, being accustomed to preserve, and not to destroy them: or by the civil law, which happens when a free person, above the age of twenty, suffers himself to be sold for the sake of sharing the price given for him. The author of the Commentaries on the Laws of England thus combats the reasonableness of all these grounds [1. b. c. 423.]: "The conqueror," says he, "according to the civilians, had a right to the life of his captives; and having spared that, has a right to deal with him as he pleases. But it is an untrue position, when taken generally, that by the law of nature or nations, a man may kill his enemy: he has a right to kill him only in particular cases; in cases of absolute necessity for self-defence; and it is plain that this absolute necessity did not subsist, since the victor did not actually kill him, but made him prisoner. War itself is justifiable only on principles of self-preservation; and therefore it gives no other right over prisoners but merely to disable them from doing harm to us, by confining their persons: much less can it give a right to kill, torture, abuse, plunder, or even to enslave, an enemy, when the war is over. Since therefore the right of _making_ slaves by captivity, depends on a supposed right of slaughter, that foundation failing, the consequence drawn from it must fail likewise. But, secondly, it is said slavery may begin _jure civili_; when one man sells himself to another. This, if only meant of contracts to serve, or work for, another, is very just: but when applied to strict slavery, in the sense of the laws of old Rome or modern Barbary, is also impossible. Every sale implies a price, a _quid pro quo_, an equivalent given to the seller, in lieu of what he transfers to