Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of WealthRyan, John A. (John Augustine)
PhilosophyChristian
Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth
Ryan, John A. (John Augustine)
Economic history; Income distribution -- Moral and ethical aspects; Wealth -- Religious aspects
The second intrinsic ground upon which interest is defended, is the
_service_ performed by the capitalist when he permits his capital to
be used in production. Without capital, labourers and consumers would
be unable to command more than a fraction of their present means of
livelihood. From this point of view we see that the service in
question is worth all that is paid in the form of interest.
Nevertheless it does not follow that the capitalist has a claim in
strict justice to any payment for this service. According to St.
Thomas, a seller may not charge a buyer an extra amount merely because
of the extra value attached to the commodity by the latter.[138] In
other words, a man cannot justly be required to pay an unusual price
for a benefit or advantage or service, when the seller undergoes no
unusual deprivation. Father Lehmkuhl carries the principle further,
and declares that the seller has a right to compensation only when and
to the extent that he undergoes a privation or undertakes a
responsibility.[139] According to this rule, the capitalist would have
no right to interest; for as mere interest-receiver he undergoes no
privation. His risk and labour are remunerated in profits, while the
responsibility of not withdrawing from production something that can
continue in existence only by continuing in production, is scarcely
deserving of a reward according to the canons of strict justice.
Whatever we may think of this argument from authority, we find it
impossible to prove objectively that a man who renders a service to
another has an intrinsic right to anything beyond compensation for the
expenditure of money or labour involved in performing the service. The
man who throws a life preserver to a drowning person may justly demand
a payment for his trouble. On any recognised basis of compensation,
this payment will not exceed a few dollars. Yet the man whose life is
in danger would pay a million dollars for this service if he were
extremely rich. He would regard the service as worth this much to him.
Has the man with the life preserver a right to exact such a payment?
Has he a right to demand the full value of the service? No reasonable
person would answer this question otherwise than in the negative. If
the performer of the service may not charge the full value thereof, as
measured by the estimate put upon it by the recipient, it would seem
that he ought not to demand anything in excess of a fair price for his
trouble. In other words, he may not justly exact anything for the
service as such.
It would seem, then, that the capitalist has no moral claim to pure
interest on the mere ground that the use of his capital in production
constitutes a service to labourers and consumers. It would seem that
he has no right to demand a payment for a costless service.
_The Claims of Abstinence_
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account