Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of WealthRyan, John A. (John Augustine)
PhilosophyChristian
Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth
Ryan, John A. (John Augustine)
Economic history; Income distribution -- Moral and ethical aspects; Wealth -- Religious aspects
Land that was formerly useful only for
agriculture becomes profitable for a factory or a store. Through its
new external relations, the land acquires new utility; or better, its
latent and potential uses have become actual. Now these new relations,
these utility-creating and value-creating relations, have been
established by society, in its corporate capacity through civil
institutions and activities, and in its non-corporate capacity through
the economic and "social" (in the narrower "society" sense) activities
of groups and individuals. In this sense, then, the community has
created the increased land values. Has it a strict right to them? a
right so rigorous and exact that private appropriation of them is
unjust?
As we have just seen, men do not admit that mere production of value
constitutes a title of ownership. Neither the monopolist who increases
value by restricting supply, nor the pace-makers of fashion, who
increase value by merely increasing demand, are regarded as possessing
a moral right to the value that they have "created." It is increase of
utility, and not either actual or virtual increase of scarcity to
which men attribute a moral claim. Why do men assign these different
ethical qualities to the production of value? Why has the shoemaker a
right to the value that he adds to the raw material in making a pair
of shoes? What is the precise basis of his right? It cannot be labour
merely; for the cotton monopolist has laboured in getting his corner
on cotton. It cannot be the fact that the shoemaker's labour is
socially useful; for a chemist might spend laborious days and nights
producing water from its component elements, and find his product a
drug on the market. Yet he would have no reasonable ground of
complaint. Why, then, is it reasonable for the shoemaker to require,
why has he a right to require payment for the utilities that he
produces? Because men want to use his products, and because they have
no right to require him to serve them without compensation. He is
morally and juridically their equal, and has the same right as they to
have access on reasonable terms to the earth and the earth's
possibilities of a livelihood. Being thus equal to his fellows, he is
under no obligation to subordinate himself to them by becoming a mere
instrument for their welfare. To assume that he is obliged to produce
socially useful things without remuneration, is to assume that all
these propositions are false; it is to assume that his life and
personality and personal development are of no intrinsic importance,
and that his pursuit of the essential ends of life has no meaning
except in so far as may be conducive to his function as an instrument
of production. In a word, the ultimate basis of the producer's right
to his product, or its value, is the fact that this is the only way in
which he can get his just share of the earth's goods, and of the means
of life and personal development. His right to compensation does not
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account