Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth — John Shaqi
Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of WealthRyan, John A. (John Augustine)
PhilosophyChristian
Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth
Ryan, John A. (John Augustine)
Economic history; Income distribution -- Moral and ethical aspects; Wealth -- Religious aspects
The conclusions of the preceding chapter include the statement that
individuals are morally justified in becoming and remaining
landowners. May we take a further step, and assert that private
landownership is a natural right of the individual? If it is, the
abolition of it by the State, even with compensation to the owners,
would be an act of injustice. The doctrine of natural rights is so
prominent in the arguments of both the advocates and the opponents of
private landownership that it deserves specific treatment. Moreover,
the claim that private landownership is a natural right rests upon
precisely the same basis as the similar claim with regard to the
individual ownership of capital; and the conclusions pertinent to the
former will be equally applicable to the latter.
A natural right is a right derived from the nature of the individual,
and existing for his welfare. Hence it differs from a civil right,
which is derived from society or the State, and is intended for a
social or civil purpose. Such, for example, is the right to vote, or
the right to hold a public office. Since a natural right neither
proceeds from nor is primarily designed for a civil end, it cannot be
annulled, and it may not be ignored, by the State. For example: the
right to life and the right to liberty are so sacred to the
individual, so necessary to his welfare, that the State cannot
rightfully kill an innocent man, nor punish him by a term in prison.
_Three Principal Kinds of Natural Rights_
Although natural rights are all equally valid, they differ in regard
to their basis, and their urgency or importance. From this point of
view, we may profitably distinguish three principal types.
The first is exemplified in the right to live. The object of this
right, life itself, is intrinsically good, good for its own sake, an
end in itself. It is the end to which even civil society is a means.
Since life is good intrinsically, the right to life is also valid
intrinsically, and not because of consequences. Since there is no
conceivable equivalent for life in the case of any individual in any
contingency, the right to life is immediate and direct in all possible
circumstances.
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