Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of WealthRyan, John A. (John Augustine)
PhilosophyChristian
Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth
Ryan, John A. (John Augustine)
Economic history; Income distribution -- Moral and ethical aspects; Wealth -- Religious aspects
Is it not obliged to go further, and pay for the positive gains that
many of the owners would have reaped in the absence of the law? For
example: a piece of land is worth one thousand dollars the day after
the tax goes into effect, and that was exactly the price paid for it
by the present owner; another piece has the same value, but was bought
by the present owner for eight hundred dollars. While neither of these
men suffer any loss on their investments, they are deprived of
possible gains; for had the law not been enacted their holdings would
be worth, say, eleven hundred dollars. Nevertheless, they are no worse
off in this respect than those persons who buy land after the
increment tax goes into effect, and have no greater claim to
compensation for abolished opportunities of positive gain. As we have
seen above, the certain advantages of the measure to the community,
the doubtful advantages to individuals of profiting by changes in
price which do not represent labour, expense, or saving, show that the
owners have no strict right to compensation. And it is still clearer
that no landowner has a valid claim on account of value increases that
would have taken place subsequent to the time that the measure was
enacted. There is no way by which owners who would have held their
land long enough to profit by these increments can be distinguished
from owners who would not have availed themselves of this conjectural
opportunity, nor any method by which the amount of such gains can be
determined.
On the other hand, it might be objected that, in reimbursing all
owners who suffer the positive losses above described, the State is
unduly generous; for if the law had not been enacted many of the
reimbursed persons would have sold their holdings at a price
insufficient to cover their losses. But these cannot be distinguished
from those who would have sold at a remunerative price. Hence the
State must compensate all or none. The former alternative is not only
the more just all round, but in the long run the more expedient.
In view of the social benefits of the increment tax, especially the
removal of many of the inequities of the present taxing system, the
State might sometimes be justified in making good only a part of the
losses that we have been discussing. But this could probably occur
only for administrative reasons, such as the difficulty of determining
the persons entitled to and the amounts of compensation. It would not
be justified merely to enable the State to profit at the expense of
individuals. And, in any case, there seems to be no good reason why
the unpaid losses should amount to more than a small fraction of the
whole.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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