(2.) Whenever any object of choice is submitted to the mind, consciousness affirms, directly and positively, that, under these identical circumstances, either of two or more acts of Will is equally possible. Every man in such circumstances is as conscious of such power as he is of his own existence. In confirmation of these affirmations, let any one make the appeal to his own consciousness, when about to put forth any act of Will. He will be just as conscious that either of two or more different determinations is, in the same circumstances, equally possible, as he is of any mental state whatever. (3.) In reference to all deliberate determinations of Will in time past, the remembrance of them is attended with a consciousness the most positive, that, in the same identical circumstances, determinations precisely opposite might have been originated. Let any one recall any such determination, and the consciousness of a power to have determined differently will be just as distinctly recalled as the act itself. He cannot be more sure that he acted at all, than he will be, that he might have acted [determined] differently. All these affirmations of consciousness are false, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true. 4. A fundamental distinction which all mankind make between the phenomena of the Will, and those of the other faculties, the Sensibility for example, is a full confirmation of the doctrine of Liberty, as a truth of universal consciousness. A man is taken out of a burning furnace, with his physical system greatly injured by the fire. As a consequence, he subsequently experiences much suffering and inconvenience. For the injury done him by the fire, and for the pain subsequently experienced, he never blames or reproaches himself. With self-reproach he never says, Why, instead of being thus injured, did I not come out of the furnace as the three worthies did from that of Nebuchadnezzar? Why do I not now experience pleasure instead of pain, as a consequence of that injury? Suppose, now, that his fall into the furnace was the result of a determination formed for the purpose of self-murder. For that determination, and for not having, in the same circumstances, determined differently, he will ever after reproach himself, as most guilty in the sight of God and man. How shall we account for the absence of self-reproach in the former instance, and for its presence in the latter? If the appeal should be made to the subject, his answer would be ready. In respect to the injury and pain, in the circumstances supposed, they could not but be experienced. Such phenomena, therefore, can never be the occasion of self-reproach. In the condition in which the determination referred to was formed, a different and opposite resolution might have been originated. That particular determination, therefore, is the occasion of self-reproach. How shall we account for this distinction, which all mankind agree in making, between