Now, what is the doctrine of Ability, according to this scheme? A man, for example, commits an act of sin. He ought, in the stead of that act, to have put forth an act of obedience. Without the power to render this obedience, as President Day admits, there can be no obligation to do it. When the Necessitarian says, that the creature, when he sins, has power to obey, he means, not that under the influence under which the act of sin is committed, the creature has power to obey; but that _under a different influence he might obey_. But mark, it is under the identical influence under which a man does sin, and under which, according to the doctrine of Necessity, he cannot but sin, that he is required not to sin. Now how can a man's ability, and obligation not to sin under a given influence, grow out of the fact, that, under a different influence, an influence under which he cannot but do right, he might not sin? This is all the ability and ground of obligation as far as Ability, Natural Ability as it is called, is concerned, which the doctrine of Necessity admits. A man is, by a power absolutely irresistible, placed in circumstances in which he cannot possibly but sin. In these circumstances, it is said, that he has _natural ability_ not to sin, and consequently ought not to do it. Why? Because, to his acting differently, no change in his nature or powers is required. These are "perfect and entire, wanting nothing." All that is required is, that his _circumstances_ be changed, and then he might not sin. "In what sense," asks President Day, "is it true, that a man has power to will the contrary of what he actually wills? He has such power that, with a _sufficient inducement_, he will make an opposite choice." Is not this the strangest idea of Natural Ability as constituting the foundation of obligation, of which the human mind ever tried to conceive? In illustration, let us suppose that a man, placed in the city of New York, cannot but sin; placed in that of Boston, he cannot but be holy, and that the fact whether he is in the one or the other city depends upon the irresistible providence of God. He is placed in New York where he cannot but sin. He is told that he ought not to do it, and that he is highly guilty for not being perfectly holy. It is also asserted that he has all the powers of moral agency, all the ability requisite to lay the foundation for the highest conceivable obligation to be holy. What is the evidence? he asks. Is it possible for me, in my present circumstances, to avoid sin? and in my present circumstances, you know, I cannot but be. I acknowledge, the Necessitarian says, that under present influences, you cannot but sin, and that you cannot but be subject to these influences. Still, I affirm, that you have all the powers of moral agency, all the natural ability requisite to obedience, and to the highest conceivable obligation to obedience. Because, in the first place, even in New York, you could obey if you chose. You have,