3. When the feelings are in a state of perfect equilibrium, there can possibly, on this supposition, be no choice at all. The feelings often are, and must be, in this state, even when we are necessitated to act in some direction. The case of the bank notes above referred to, presents an example of this kind. As the objects are in the mind's eye absolutely equal, to suppose that the feelings should, in such a case, impel the Will more strongly in the direction of the one than the other, is to suppose an event without a cause, inasmuch as the Sensibility is governed by the law of Necessity. If A and B are to the Intelligence, in all respects, absolutely equal, how can the Sensibility impel the Will towards A instead of B? What is an event without a cause, if this is not? Contemplate the case in respect to the location of the universe above supposed. Each point of space was equally present to God, and was in itself, and was perceived and affirmed to be, equally eligible with all the others. How could a stronger feeling arise in the direction of one point in distinction from others, unless we suppose that God's Sensibility is not subject to the law of Necessity, a position which none will assume, or that here was an event without a cause? When, therefore, God did select this one point in distinction from all the others, that determination could not have been either in the direction of what the Intelligence affirmed to be best, nor of the strongest feeling. The proposition, therefore, that "the Will _always_ is as the greatest apparent good," is in both the senses above defined demonstrably false. 4. Of the truth of this every one is aware when he appeals to his own Consciousness. In the amputation of a limb, for example, who does not know that if an individual, at the moment when the operation commences, should yield to the strongest feeling, he would refuse to endure it? He can pass through the scene, only by placing an inflexible purpose directly across the current of feeling. How often do we hear individuals affirm, "If I should follow my _feelings_, I should do this; if I should follow my _judgment_, I should do that." In all such instances, we have the direct testimony of consciousness, that the action of the Will is not always in the direction of the strongest feeling: because its action is sometimes consciously in the direction of the Intelligence, in opposition to such feelings; and at others, in the conscious presence of such feelings, the Will remains, for periods longer or shorter, undecided in respect to the particular course which shall be pursued. THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE INTELLIGENCE AND SENSIBILITY COMBINED. III. Is not the Will always as the greatest apparent good in this sense, that its determinations are always as the affirmations of the Intelligence and the impulse of the Sensibility combined? That it is not, I argue for two reasons.