EVERY perception, every judgment, every thought, which appears within the entire sphere of the Intelligence; every sensation, every emotion, every desire, all the states of the Sensibility, present objects for the action of the Will in one direction or another. The sphere of the Will's activity, therefore, is as extensive as the vast and almost boundless range of the Intelligence and Sensibility both. Now while all the phenomena of these two last named faculties are, in themselves, wholly destitute of moral character, the action of the Will, in the direction of such phenomena, constitutes _complex_ states of mind, which have a positive moral character. In all instances, the _moral_ and _voluntary_ elements are one and identical. As the distinction under consideration has been overlooked by the great mass of philosophers and theologians, and as very great errors have thereby arisen, not only in philosophy, but in theology and morals both, I will dwell at more length upon the subject than I otherwise should have done. My remarks will be confined to the action of the Will in the direction of the _natural propensities_ and _religious affections_. ACTION OF THE WILL IN THE DIRECTION OF THE NATURAL PROPENSITIES.--EMOTION, DESIRE, AND WISH DEFINED. 1. In respect to the action of the Will in the direction of the natural propensities, such as the appetites, the love of esteem, of power, &c., I would remark, that the complex states thence resulting, are commonly explained as simple feelings or states of the Sensibility. In presenting this subject in a proper light, the following explanations are deemed necessary. When any physical power operates upon any of the organs of sense, or when any thought is present in the Intelligence, the state of the Sensibility immediately and necessarily resulting is called a _sensation_ or _emotion_. When any feeling arises impelling the Will to seek or avoid the object of that sensation or emotion, this impulsive state of the Sensibility is called a _desire_. When the Will concurs with the desire, a complex state of mind results, called a _wish_. Wish is distinguished from Desire in this, that in the former, the desire is cherished and perpetuated by the concurrence of the Will with the desire. When the Desire impels the Will towards a prohibited object, the action of the Will, in concurrence with the desire, constitutes a wish morally wrong. When the Desire impels the Will in a required direction, and the Will, from a respect to the idea of duty, concurs with the desire, a wish arises which is morally virtuous. This principle holds true in regard to the action of all the propensities. The excitement of the propensity, as a state of the Sensibility, constitutes desire--a feeling in itself destitute of all moral qualities. The action of the Will in concurrence with, or opposition to, this feeling, constitutes a complex state of mind morally right or wrong. ANGER, PRIDE, AMBITION, &c.