Anger, for example, as prohibited by the moral law, is not a mere _feeling_ of displeasure awakened by some injury, real or supposed, perpetrated by another. This state, on the other hand, consists in the surrendering of the Will to the control of that feeling, and thus acting from malign impulse. Pride also is not the mere _desire_ of esteem. It consists in voluntary subjection to that propensity, seeking esteem and admiration as the great end of existence. Ambition, too, is not mere desire of power, but the voluntary surrendering of our being to the control of that propensity. The same, I repeat, holds true in respect to all the propensities. No mere excitement of the Sensibility, irrespective of the action of the Will, has any moral character. In the action of the Will in respect to such states--action which must arise in some direction under such circumstances--moral guilt, or praiseworthiness, arises. I might here adduce other cases in illustration of the same principle; as, for example, the fact that intemperance in food and drink does not consist, as a moral act or state, in the mere strength of the appetite--that is, in the degree in which it is excited in the presence of its appropriate objects. Nor does it consist in mere excess in the quantity partaken of--excess considered as an external act. It consists, on the other hand, in the surrendering of the voluntary power to the control of the appetite. The excess referred to is the _consequent_ and _index_ of such voluntary subjection. The above examples, however, are abundantly sufficient to illustrate the principle. RELIGIOUS AFFECTIONS. 2. We will now contemplate the element of the Will in those complex phenomena denominated _religious affections_. The position which I here assume is this, that whatever in such affections is morally right and praiseworthy, that which is directly referred to, where such affections are required of us, is the voluntary element to be found in them. The voluntary element is directly required. Other elements are required only on the ground that their existence is conditioned upon, and necessarily results from, that of the voluntary element. This must be admitted, or we must deny the position established in the last Chapter, to wit: that all the requirements of the Moral law are fully met in the right action of the Will. SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY. My object now is to show, that this is the light in which the subject is really presented in the Scriptures. I will cite, as examples, the three cardinal virtues of Christianity, Repentance, Love, and Faith. The question is, Are these virtues or affections, presented in the Bible as mere convictions of the Intelligence, or states of the Sensibility? Are they not, on the other hand, presented as voluntary states of mind, or as acts of Will? Are not the commands requiring them fully met in such acts? REPENTANCE.