East-West Trade Trends: Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act); Fourth Report to Congress, Second Half of 1953United States. Foreign Operations Administration
History
East-West Trade Trends: Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act); Fourth Report to Congress, Second Half of 1953
United States. Foreign Operations Administration
Military assistance; Mutual security program, 1951-; United States -- Commercial policy
The importance which the bloc attaches to these undertakings is found
not only in the mountains of propaganda it issues on the subject,
but in the sizeable expenditures it makes. For example, in 1952
the U.S.S.R. and its satellites dominated the Bombay International
Industries Fair with four big exhibits. The Soviet exhibit was the
largest; it cost more than $200,000 and was manned by a staff of
40. Communist China's exhibit was the second most pretentious, with
Czechoslovakia and Hungary also participating in an impressive way. At
the Thailand Constitution Fair at Bangkok in December 1953, the Soviet
exhibit was again the most elaborate. The Soviet Government established
a special pavilion that cost an estimated $500,000 and housed 5,000
items, including trucks, automobiles, precision equipment, glassware,
rugs, and preserved foods.
Yet another device was to join hands with a key nation of each
continent in a brand-new impressive trade agreement which seemed to
offer attractive benefits to that nation and which might stimulate
neighboring countries to hanker after similar opportunities. The
Kremlin chose India and Argentina. The U.S.S.R. concluded trade
agreements with those two countries for the first time. So did some
of the European satellites, and other satellites renewed existing
agreements. The U.S.S.R. and the satellites also renewed existing
agreements with certain other countries in Asia and Latin America.
The two-year Russian trade agreement with Argentina, signed in August
1953, was one of the most interesting of the year. For one thing
it came at a time when trading missions of the U.S.S.R. and its
satellites were becoming more active throughout Latin America--and the
Soviet-Argentina agreement helped those missions to gain a somewhat
more receptive audience for their overtures. Latin American governments
have cooperated with other Western nations in withholding highly
strategic commodities from the Soviet bloc; for example, bloc proposals
to buy Chilean copper and Bolivian antimony and lead were not accepted.
Obviously the Kremlin hoped to bring about more resistance to the
control of strategic materials and to create Western disunity over that
issue.
This trade agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Argentina was also
interesting for its size and composition, at least on paper. It called
for deliveries of $60 million in each direction, presumably during the
first year, with an additional Soviet credit of $30 million. Argentine
shipments were to include wool, hides, linseed oil, meat, and other
goods that the Soviet Union could undoubtedly use. But the list of
Soviet exports included some items for which the Soviet bloc seemed to
have equal or greater need. The U.S.S.R. promised to deliver a large
quantity of machinery and transportation equipment on credit, as well
as petroleum, coal, and other items. Proposals to deliver certain kinds
of machinery also cropped up in Soviet agreements with India and Iran.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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