In the absence of Soviet-bloc policies conducive to furnishing a long-term steady supply of exports desired by free-world countries, the West could hardly expect East-West trade to return to the prewar volume, though a short-term boost would not be surprising. The combined value of the trade in both directions between the free world and the Soviet bloc in Europe was $2.6 billion in 1951 ... $2.4 billion in 1952 ... and about $2.2 billion in 1953. By contrast, total foreign trade within the free world in 1953 was about $148 billion. It is not only the amount of trade that must be considered, however, and that is why we have devoted attention in this report to what goods were involved and what the new Soviet regime was trying to accomplish. =The Free World Is Strong= What are the implications of all this for the free world? In the face of the Soviet objectives, methods, and recent trade activities, one can recognize the inadequacy of two extreme policies that are often urged upon Western governments. Those extremes are: 1. Complete embargo on trade with the bloc. 2. Completely unrestricted commercial relations with the bloc. Complete embargo would be the conventional answer in military conflict. But to urge complete embargo in the present situation is to ignore the fact that the present trade situation offers opportunities to the free world. The free world, with its enormous production, can benefit from trade; the test is what goods are traded and on what terms. The free nations are stronger economically than they have ever been. Collectively they are far stronger than the Soviet bloc. They possess tremendous resources. On the whole they have solid and healthy competitive systems. Their businessmen have behind them centuries of experience in bargaining, merchandising, and servicing. With these factors creating for the free world a currently strong trading position, the free-world nations should be able to take advantage of the needs of the Soviet bloc and by hard bargaining gain benefits from East-West trade. Completely normal and unrestricted commercial relations with the bloc seem to be equally unsuitable as a course of action. If the free world should abandon the controls it has imposed in the interest of national security, drop its guard and permit unrestricted trade in _all_ its raw materials, industrial goods, and advanced technology--the free world would be the loser. In view of the Communist objectives and methods, unrestricted trade would permit the bloc to increase its war potential--and specifically the all-important economic base of its war potential--faster than it otherwise could. The goods received by the free world would bring no commensurate return.