East-West Trade Trends: Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act); Fourth Report to Congress, Second Half of 1953United States. Foreign Operations Administration
History
East-West Trade Trends: Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act); Fourth Report to Congress, Second Half of 1953
United States. Foreign Operations Administration
Military assistance; Mutual security program, 1951-; United States -- Commercial policy
All foreign trade of the countries of the enlarged Soviet empire was
placed under absolute state control. For both the U.S.S.R. and the
satellites, international trade is now not only a 100-percent monopoly
of the state, but also an integral part of the planned economy,
officially proclaimed as such. Each country, as a part of its general
economic plan, estimates its import requirements and then develops a
program of exports to pay for the imports. These country plans are
coordinated by Moscow. Part of the machinery of all this economic
planning and trade coordination is an organization, with headquarters
in Moscow, called the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance.
This totalitarian trading system insures that foreign trade serves the
purposes of the state.
Top priority in trade planning is given to the requirements of the
U.S.S.R. Bloc countries are required to give one another preferential
treatment in trade. With this system the export of any items to the
West is easily restricted as it suits government purposes--whether or
not the items could be considered as "strategic."
A vast amount of commercial information is obtained by bloc governments
through their dealings with free-world traders and through their
intelligence services. This provides Moscow with a comprehensive
picture of the bargaining strengths and weaknesses of free-world
traders.
Moreover the Soviet-bloc governments, as large buyers and sellers
controlling the production and trade of a whole country, indeed a group
of countries, enjoy certain bargaining advantages in dealing with the
many smaller competing buyers and sellers in the marketplaces of the
free world. Since losses on individual transactions can be absorbed in
longer-term government gains on other deals, the unit profit need not
be the factor that determines the advantage of a deal, as it generally
does for the free-world trader. Soviet-bloc governments can--and not
infrequently do--set their prices at levels which discriminate among
the various buyers and sellers with whom they deal. They exercise
monopoly control not only in selling their own goods abroad but also
in disposing of imported goods at home. The Soviet-bloc governments
get bargaining advantages from such practices, made possible by their
totalitarian trading system--practices which the West would not wish to
imitate but which it might as well squarely face.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account