Whilst, in these days of enlightenment and of perfectly altered circumstances, we can see how, without sacrificing universal religious liberty, we can protect ourselves against the danger of Papal ascendancy and despotism, should that danger again threaten us, it is proper to take into account the whole case respecting the conduct of our ancestors in the last two Stuart reigns, and to remember that they dreaded such broad toleration, because they apprehended it would lead to the supremacy of Romanism; and they could not see how it was possible, in this case, to concede liberty without opening a gate for the entrance of injustice. There was wisdom in the end they kept in view, though there was error in the method they employed for its attainment. [Sidenote: 1681.] It is ridiculous to look upon the Earl of Shaftesbury as the Æolus who let loose the anti-Papal winds. He doubtless availed himself of the public favour to accomplish ends of his own, and the elevation of the Duke of Monmouth to the honour of legitimacy and heirship was with him a favourite idea, equally absurd and mischievous; but the desire, prevalent for a time, of cutting off the entail of the crown from the King’s brother, was no creation of a single person, but the offspring of public sentiment, and the outgrowth of years on years. Indignation against Popery, and the support of an Exclusion Bill, intimately connected as cause and effect, were two distinct things: but although the former continued in unabated force, the latter dwindled away, and the nation came to acquiesce, so far as the succession to the throne was concerned, in the policy of the Court. The reasons are easily assigned. Popular falsehoods respecting the Popish plots exploded in disgrace, and honest folks saw they had been deceived by knaves. From dislike to Rome, her doctrines, her polity, and her worship, some diseased secretions, which had gathered over feeling, came to be rubbed off. Romanists had been found less desperate plotters than had been dreamed. Limitations upon the descent of the crown appeared more efficacious than they had done before. The probability of another Civil War, if James were excluded, alarmed many; personal sympathy with a Sovereign required to perform so unnatural an act as that of disinheriting a brother, prevailed with more; and perhaps, considering the Royal ages, the uncertainty of the contemplated emergency influenced most. In this last respect, a manifest difference exists between the policy of an Exclusion Bill founded on a contingency which might never occur, and the policy of a Revolution based upon the despotic proceedings of an actual King. That these reasons proved effective is plain; whether they were valid and wise is another point. The sequel showed a Revolution to be inevitable. To have anticipated the event of 1688 might have saved England some trouble and much suffering; but England has always been slow to depart from