The question of assembling Convocation started from an historical point of view, but it came before the public mind in its constitutional and practical bearings; yet, amidst the multitude of publications on the subject, one seeks in vain for a consistent and satisfying treatment of the subject on either side. Those who believed in Convocation, and who wished to see it vigorously revived, did not dare to express all that they believed, or all that they wished; they were checked by the spirit of the age, and hampered by the circumstances of the Church. At the same time they ignored the great change which had come over political and ecclesiastical affairs through the Revolution, and they also shut their eyes to the fact, that it is impossible to enjoy State patronage and emoluments without some abridgment of ecclesiastical action. Those who wished Convocation should not assemble feared to deny its rights, and shrunk from either proposing its extinction or advocating its reform. They only desired to mesmerize it, till clerical animosities should expire, and the Church should be of one mind--a consummation no nearer now than it was then. The prudence forced upon this class of persons by their political position, asserted itself at the expense of logical consistency; and, as is often the case, practical sagacity made men awkward reasoners. There might be arguments for abolishing Convocation, or modifying its powers--at any rate for defining them; but, whilst no such arguments were urged, it was impossible to silence gainsayers, who contended that practice ought to be accordant with theory. If Convocations be like Parliaments, things in themselves good and wise, differences of opinion no more furnish reasons against Convocations than against Parliaments. If what Clarendon says be true, “that of all mankind, none form so bad an estimate of human affairs as Churchmen,”[331] that may be an argument for extinguishing Convocational rights, not for continuing to them a nominal instead of a real existence. [Sidenote: 1700.]