The revision of the tariff of 1913, viewed with non-partizan eyes, appears to have been carried out, to say the least, as consistently with regard to its professed doctrine, and as little influenced by the malevolent arts of the old-time Congressional lobby, as any debated tariff act in our history. It still contains on the whole a large measure of protection. Under various pretexts such as the danger of a flood of cheap goods after the close of the great war, attempts will be made to make it still more prohibitive. But one lesson of our tariff history is that such an act should be given a period of fair trial before extensive changes are made in it. Even further reductions should be cautiously undertaken and put into effect gradually. If the attempt is made through temporary rates to reduce the shock of the trade adjustments, of the "dumping" after the war, then the devising and administration of such measures should be delegated to an expert, disinterested, permanent tariff board. The task is to prevent temporary "unfair competition" and sudden changes, rather than to raise permanent barriers to fair trade.[14] [Footnote 1: It is evident that it is only through _ad valorem_ rates that it is possible to compare the average rate of duty for one tariff act, with that for another. As, however, every tariff act is made up of both specific and _ad valorem_ duties, it is only at the end of the year that an average _ad valorem_ rate can be estimated by comparing the total of duties collected with the total estimated value of the goods imported. Average _ad valorem_ rates are estimated in this way both on the dutiable goods alone, and on all goods, free and dutiable combined. There may be an element of error, even of misrepresentation, in such estimates. They do not give the simple test of the relative height of duties, or of the degree of "protection" that we might at first suppose. Just to the extent that a new and higher rate really operates to exclude imports (and thus is protective in its effect) the goods subject to that rate cease to form part of the total imports. For example, if the average rate of duty were 25 per cent, and a 50 per cent rate on an article were increased to 75 per cent, it is possible that this rate would prove to be absolutely prohibitive. This raise of rate, therefore, would tend to reduce the average rates collected on all dutiable articles. Changes in general conditions of industry from causes quite apart from the tariff may result in shifting the proportions of imports that are dutiable so that the average rates go either up or down while the tariff law has remained unchanged on the statute book. A failure to consider these and related facts leads to much confusion in popular and political discussion of the tariff.]