[Footnote 2: Usually given as 20 per cent. However a good many rates under the full operation of the act worked out as 21-1/2 or 23 per cent, and a few at 26 and at 29 per cent. Besides there were numerous specific rates, the _ad valorem_ force of which cannot be determined.] [Footnote 3: The political argument that the small tariff reduction of 1857 caused the crisis of 1857 will not bear serious examination. See below, sec. 13.] [Footnote 4: See ch. 14, sec. 2.] [Footnote 5: See above, sec. 2, note 1.] [Footnote 6: Internal revenue receipts in 1866 had been $309,000,000; in 1872 they had fallen to $131,000,000, yet the government's surplus for the three years 1870-1872 was little less than $100,000,000 a year. This was almost half of the total receipts from customs, which were $216,000,000.] [Footnote 7: Other issues absorbed public attention in this period--the Spanish war, colonial policy, "imperialism," railway rate regulation, corporation control, etc.] [Footnote 8: See above, sec. 2.] [Footnote 9: Compare with ch. 13, sec. 5.] [Footnote 10: Probably resulting from the rising prices, as explained above, sec. 2. For example, in one year, from 1899 to 1900, the average _ad valorem_ rate collected on dutiable goods fell 3 per cent, and that on all goods fell 2 per cent; in the two years from 1904 to 1906 the average rates on dutiable fell 4 per cent, and on all goods fell 2 per cent.] [Footnote 11: This "competitive principle" is essentially the same as the so-called "true principle" of equalizing the cost of production (see above, sec. 11). It is essentially a prohibitive, not a free trade, principle. Strictly applied it would cause complete exclusion of imports. But as applied to selected articles which it is desired to exclude in order to "protect" the domestic producer, this principle would simply prevent the rate being placed appreciably higher than was needed to exclude them. Anything beyond that point but offers temptation and opportunity for the formation of a monopoly by domestic producers. Then, too, the rate may intentionally be fixed so as to make just possible the survival of the most favorably located or most efficiently operated establishments, while compelling the abandonment of other establishments. See ch. 14, sec. 3.] [Footnote 12: Such changes are logically related to the subject of financial crises rather than to that of the tariff. See note at end of the next section.] [Footnote 13: See Vol. I, e.g., pp. 228, 431, 445ff, 466, 490, 506ff.]