§ 2. #The general property tax; nature and difficulty.# The rates both of assessment and of levy of the general property tax are uniform and equal in proportion to the value of all (or nearly all) property in the taxing district.[1] There are always some exceptions of certain kinds of property, or of the property of certain persons, or of property and things put to certain uses--public, educational, religious, and charitable in their nature. The federal government levies no general property tax, but the other branches of government[2] receive about three-fifths of all their revenues from it. At first view nothing would seem to be simpler and juster in principle than such a plan of taxation, but those who have most carefully studied its practical operation, almost with one accord, pronounce it to be "a dismal failure." The chief reason assigned for this failure has been that the assessment of the tax is imperfect and incomplete. The usual thought is that if all property could be assessed the plan would be excellent. Undoubtedly the difficulty of just assessment has its part in the weakness of the tax, but back of, and more important than this, is an inherent fallacy in the apparently simple principle of the tax. § 3. #Ambiguity of the term "property."# Unfortunately, the word property is applied, even by the most competent courts, both to the intangible right of ownership (the fundamental meaning) and to the concrete thing that is owned, the source of the income.[3] But evidently the value of the right to the income yielded by a house, for example, is merely the value of the house. The value of the _property in the one sense_ (the abstract ownership, the intangible right) is merely a reflection of the value of the _property in the other sense_ (the concrete wealth). There are not here two independent bodies of economic wealth. Whatever value belongs to the one is subtracted from the other. Nor is it rational to take the paper document called a deed (which is but the evidence of ownership) and call it tangible property having a value in addition to the house itself. Yet, in fact, all these confusions are constantly made in taxation. The term "intangible personal property" is applied to such things as mercantile credits, promissory notes, bonds--in general to the right to collect sums from another person, whether these rights arise out of sales or of loans--and all are treated as parts of taxable property. Sometimes the evidences of indebtedness, the promissory notes or the mortgage papers, are even called tangible property, the same term that is applied to land, houses, and machinery. By universal practice supported by a long line of court decisions, these rights (whether evidenced by paper or not) are made subject to taxation, except as by piecemeal legislation certain grudging exceptions have been made. These views and this practice are supported by the popular desire to tax money-lenders. The result is "double taxation" of many sources of