The gradual change in the critical attitude is illustrated also by Lord Kames, whom Heath had reason to describe, before the appearance of Johnson’s Preface, as “the truest judge and most intelligent admirer of Shakespeare.”(26) The scheme of his _Elements of Criticism_ (1762) allowed him to deal with Shakespeare only incidentally, as in the digression where he distinguishes between the presentation and the description of passion, but he gives more decisive expression to Warton’s view that observance of the rules is of subordinate importance to the truthful exhibition of character. The mechanical part, he observes, in which alone Shakespeare is defective, is less the work of genius than of experience, and it is knowledge of human nature which gives him his supremacy. The same views are repeated in the periodical essays. The _Mirror_ regards it as “preposterous” to endeavour to regularise his plays, and finds the source of his superiority in his almost supernatural powers of invention, his absolute command over the passions, and his wonderful knowledge of nature; and the _Lounger_ says that he presents the abstract of life in all its modes and in every time. The rules are forgotten,—we cease to hear even that they are useless. But the _Elements of Criticism_ gave Kames no opportunity to show that his attitude to the characters themselves was other than Warton’s. No critic had questioned Shakespeare’s truth to nature. The flower of Pope’s Preface is the section on his knowledge of the world and his power over the passions. Lyttleton showed his intimacy with Pope’s opinion when in his _Dialogues of the Dead_ he made him say: “No author had ever so copious, so bold, so _creative_ an imagination, with so perfect a knowledge of the passions, the humours and sentiments of mankind. He painted all characters, from kings down to peasants, with equal truth and equal force. If human nature were destroyed, and no monument were left of it except his works, other beings might know what man was from those writings.” The same eulogy is repeated in other words by Johnson. And in Gray’s _Progress of Poesy_ Shakespeare is “Nature’s Darling.” It was his diction which gave most scope to the censure of the better critics. An age whose literary watchwords were simplicity and precision was bound to remark on his obscurities and plays on words, and even, as Dryden had done, on his bombast. What Shaftesbury(27) or Atterbury(28) had said at the beginning of the century is repeated, as we should expect, by the rhetoricians, such as Blair. But it was shown by Kames that the merit of Shakespeare’s language lay in the absence of those abstract and general terms which were the blemish of the century’s own diction. “Shakespeare’s style in that respect,” says Kames, “is excellent: every article in his descriptions is particular, as in nature.” And herein Kames gave independent expression to the views of the poet who is said to have lived in the wrong century.