Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
See _Der Menschliche Weltbegriff_, pp. 21-62; and, for the merely
English reader, Ward, _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, vol. ii p. 168 ff.
Footnote 53:
This is true even in what seems at first the the exceptional case of
advance in mere theoretical insight. The more clearly you realise the
character of the problems which your own intellectual pursuits lead up
to and the nature of their solution, the clearer becomes your insight
into the problems and purposes of other workers in the same field.
-----
CHAPTER II
THE SYSTEMATIC UNITY OF REALITY
§ 1. The problem whether Reality is ultimately One or Many is inevitably
suggested to us by the diverse aspects of our own direct experience
of the world. The different theories may be classed, according to
their solution of this problem, as Monistic, Pluralistic, and
Monadistic. § 2. Pluralism starts from the presumed fact of the
mutual independence of human selves, and teaches that this
independence of each other belongs to all real beings. But (_a_) the
independence with which experience presents us is never complete,
nor the unity of the “selves” perfect. (_b_) The theory is
inconsistent with the systematic character of all reality as
presupposed in both knowledge and action. § 3. Monadism again makes
the systematic unity of the real either an illusion or an
inexplicable accident. § 4. Reality, because systematic, must be the
expression of a single principle in and through a multiplicity. The
unity and multiplicity must both be real, and each must necessarily
involve the other. § 5. If both are to be equally real, the whole
system must be a single experience, and its constituents must also
be experiences. A perfect systematic whole can be neither an
aggregate, nor a mechanical whole of parts, nor an organism. The
whole must exist for the parts, and they for it. § 6. This may also
be expressed by saying that Reality is a subject which is the unity
of subordinate subjects, or an individual of which the constituents
are lesser individuals. § 7. The nearest familiar analogue to such a
systematic whole would be the relation between our whole “self” and
the partial mental systems or lesser “selves.” § 8. The nearest
historic parallel to this view is to be found in Spinoza’s theory of
the relation of the human mind to the “infinite intellect of God.”
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