Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
§ 1. The problem of the One and the Many is as old as Philosophy itself,
and inevitably arises from the earliest and simplest attempts to think
in a consistent way about the nature of the world in which we play our
part. On the one hand, our experience, in the piecemeal shape in which
it first appears as we begin to reflect on it, seems to exhibit an
indefinite plurality of more or less independent things, each pursuing
its own course and behaving in its own way, and connected at best with
only a few of the other members of our environment. There is, for
instance, no obvious connection between one man’s career and those of
most of his contemporaries, to say nothing of the innumerable host of
his predecessors and successors in the race of life. And, similarly, the
behaviour of one inanimate thing seems at first sight to be unaffected
by that of most of the other things around it. The world seems to us at
times to be made up of an indefinite multiplicity of beings who merely
happen to be actors on the same stage, but have, in the majority of
cases, no influence upon each other’s parts.
Yet, on the other hand, there are equally strong _primâ facie_ reasons
for regarding the world as a single unity. Every addition to our
theoretical insight into the structure of things adds to our recognition
of the intimate connection between things and processes which previously
seemed merely disconnected. Physical science, as it grows, learns more
and more to look upon nature as a realm of interconnected events where
no one fact is ultimately entirely independent of any other fact;
political experience and social science alike reveal the intimate
interdependence of human lives and purposes. And, over and above the
ascertained empirical facts which point to the ultimate unity of the
world, there is another potent influence which we might call the
“instinctive” basis for the belief in unity. However discontinuous my
environment may appear, it is never a mere disconnected multiplicity.
The very circumstance that it is throughout _my_ environment, and thus
relative to the ends by which my attention is determined, gives it to a
certain degree the character of a coherent system. At the lowest level
of philosophic reflection, we cannot permanently fail to apprehend our
world as in principle one, precisely because it is _our_ world, and we
ourselves are all in some degree beings of steady systematic purpose,
not mere bundles of disconnected and conflicting impulses. While yet
again, it is the very limitation of our own interests and our lack of
clear insight into their full import which leads us at other times to
find apparent disconnected multiplicity and lack of cohesion in our
world.
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