As Aristotle more than once says, a human hand, for instance, is not when severed from the rest of the body a “hand” at all, except ὁμωνύμως “equivocally,” any more than the “hand” of a statue is a true hand. (_I.e._ it is only a “true hand” so long as it _does the work_ of a hand. Captain Cuttle’s hook probably deserved the name of “hand” better than the severed member it replaced). Footnote 61: I shall attempt to show in a later chapter (Bk. IV. chap. 3) that, in any useful signification of the term “self,” Reality is not a “self” nor yet a mere community of “selves.” Footnote 62: Again, I must remind the reader that this recognition of the teleological character of mind does not in the least preclude the necessity for psychological analysis of mental states. Still less does it require us to include in our analysis a volitional element as one distinguishable aspect or component of the isolated mental state by the side of others, such as the presentational and emotional aspects. It might even be contended that a “tripartite” or three-aspect Psychology commits the mistake of counting in the whole psychical fact as one of its own components. Footnote 63: See _infra_, Bk. IV. chap. 3, where we shall find that the relation of the individual self to a social whole probably furnishes a still better, though not altogether satisfactory, illustration of our principle. Footnote 64: For Spinoza’s doctrine see especially _Ethics_, I. 15, 25; II. 11, 40; III. 6-9; V. 22, 23, with the explanations of any good exposition of his system, such as that of Pollock or Joachim. Footnote 65: See further on the “Parallelistic” doctrine, Bk. IV. chap. 2. CHAPTER III REALITY AND ITS APPEARANCES—THE DEGREES OF REALITY