Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
§ 1. Reality being a single systematic whole, the nature of its
constituent elements is only finally intelligible in the light of
the whole system. Hence each of its “appearances,” if considered as
a whole in itself, must be more or less contradictory. § 2. But some
“appearances” exhibit the structure of the whole more adequately
than others, and have therefore a higher degree of reality. § 3.
This conception of degree of reality may be illustrated by
comparison with the successive orders of infinites and
infinitesimals in Mathematics. It would be the task of a complete
Philosophy to assign the contents of the world to their proper place
in the series of “orders” of reality. § 4. In general any
subordinate whole is real in proportion as it is a self-contained
whole. And it is a self-contained whole in proportion as it is (_a_)
comprehensive, (_b_) systematic; that is, a thing is real just so
far as it is truly individual. § 5. The two criteria of
individuality, though ultimately coincident, tend in particular
cases to fall apart for our insight, owing to the limitation of
human knowledge. § 6. Ultimately only the whole system of experience
is completely individual, all other individuality is approximate. §
7. In other words, the whole system of experience is an infinite
individual, all subordinate individuality is finite. Comparison of
this position with the doctrines of Leibnitz. § 8. Recapitulatory
statement of the relation of Reality to its Appearances.
§ 1. Reality, we have seen, is to be thought of as a systematic whole
forming a single individual experience, which is composed of elements or
constituents which are in their turn individual experiences. In each of
these constituents the nature of the whole system manifests itself in a
special way. Each of them contributes its own peculiar content to the
whole system, and as the suppression or change of any one of them would
alter the character of the whole, so it is the nature of the whole which
determines the character of each of its constituents. In this way the
whole and its constituent members are in complete interpenetration and
form a perfect systematic unity. In the happy phrase of Leibnitz, we may
say that each of the partial experiences reflects the whole system from
its own peculiar “point of view.” If we call the completed system, as it
is for itself, Reality _par excellence_, we may appropriately speak of
the partial experiences in which its nature is diversely manifested as
its Appearances. We must remember, however, that to call them
appearances is not to stamp them as illusory or unreal. They will only
be illusory or unreal when we forget that they are one and all partial
aspects or manifestations of a whole of which none of them adequately
exhausts the contents.
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