Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
And precisely because the whole of experience is a single system, no
lesser system within the whole is entirely explicable in terms of its
own internal structure. For a full understanding of the nature of the
lesser system, and of the way in which it manifests a common character
through the variety of its elements, you have always, in the last
resort, to go outside the system itself, and take into account its
relation to the rest of the whole system of existence. And for that very
reason no subordinate individual, considered in itself, is a completely
coherent self-determined whole. For a limited knowledge like our own,
which has in the main to deal with subordinate systems as we find them,
and without that complete understanding of the whole structure of
Reality which would enable us to see their precise place in the whole,
the subordinate systems themselves, when closely scanned by a resolute
philosophical analysis, will inevitably exhibit some degree of
discrepancy and want of systematic unity.
Consider, for instance, such a system as is formed by the life-work of a
man of marked “individuality.” On the whole, the life of such a man may
fairly be said to be the systematic working out of a consistent scheme
of purposes. But this is, after all, only approximately the truth. It is
not the case that the nature of the central or dominant purpose of the
scheme is of itself enough to determine the nature and order of the
successive stages by which it finds expression. We have to take into
account factors in the man’s “heredity,” and again in his social and
physical environment which form no part of the nature of his central
dominant ideal and yet influence the manner of its fulfilment. We are
thus thrown back for our full understanding of the “individual” system
in question upon circumstances which are, so far as that system is
concerned, “accidental,” _i.e._ which are equally with itself part of
the whole system of experienced fact, without our being able to see
_how_ it and they form a wider coherent whole. The subordinate
individual, because incapable of explication solely from within, is in
the end only approximately “individual,” and we therefore fall into
contradictions whenever we isolate it from the rest of Reality and treat
it as absolutely individual and self-contained.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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