Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
Thus the “activity” of Leibnitz exactly corresponds to what we have
called individuality, and his “passivity” to that want of complete
internal systematisation which we have found inseparable from finite
existence. The immense significance of this definition of activity and
passivity in terms of internal systematisation will be more apparent
when we come, in our concluding book, to discuss the meaning of human
freedom, and its connection with determination and “causality.” For the
present it is enough to note that our own doctrine is substantially that
of Leibnitz freed from the inconsistency which is introduced into it by
the monadistic assumption of the complete independence of the various
finite individuals. It is, of course, impossible to unite, as Leibnitz
tried to do, the two thoughts. Either there is ultimately only one
independent individual, the infinite individual whole, or there is no
meaning in speaking of higher and lower degrees of individuality.
Leibnitz’s inconsistency on this point seems due entirely to his desire
to maintain the absolute individuality of the particular human “soul,” a
desire which is explained, partly at least, by his anxiety not to come
into collision, as Spinoza and others had done, with the official
theology of the period.
§ 8. The definition of infinite and finite individuality completes the
general outline of our conception of Reality as a whole, and its
relation to its constituent elements. Recapitulating that doctrine, we
may now say that the real is a single all-embracing whole of experience
or psychical matter of fact, determined entirely from within by a
principle of internal structure, and therefore completely individual.
Because the matter of the system is in all its parts experience, the
principle of its structure must be teleological in character.[71] That
is, the system must be the embodiment, in a harmonious unity of
conscious feeling, of a consistent interest or mental attitude. As such
we may call it the realisation indifferently of a purpose or idea, and
we may speak of the absolute experience as the completed expression of
an absolute knowledge or an absolute will.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account