Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
Even in our rough-and-ready way of treating continuity of contour as
evidence of oneness in inanimate and apparently structureless masses, we
may detect the influence of this principle. We judge the sensibly
continuous mass to be one rather than many things, because in many
obvious respects it functions as one (_e.g._, in respect of its weight,
the simultaneous displacement of its parts in rotation or translation
through space). Also, no doubt, our judgment is influenced by the
analogy of our own bodies, which are sensibly continuous. We project in
imagination into the sensibly continuous inanimate mass the same kind of
teleological unity which we find in our own mental life. The sensibly
discontinuous, on the other hand (_e.g._, two inorganic masses separated
by an apparently empty interval), is judged to be many things rather
than one, because, in imagination, we project such an inner mental life
into each of the discontinuous parts.
If all this is so, it would follow that the line of demarcation between
one thing and another can never be drawn with hard and fast precision.
For if one thing ultimately means one individual, the embodiment of a
unique self-consistent idea, the only thing which is fully and
absolutely one will be the infinite individual Reality itself. The
extent to which any lesser portion of the whole can be pronounced one
thing will depend on the extent to which it exhibits self-contained
systematic individuality, and thus will be a matter of degree. The
highest kind of finite unity we can conceive will be that of a life
which is the conscious progressive realisation of coherent purpose. Such
a life is one not merely for the outside observer who detects its
underlying unity of aim, but for itself. Its oneness may thus be said to
be both objective and subjective. Thus the more completely our own inner
life is the systematic expression of consistent purpose, the greater the
right with which we may regard ourselves as being each truly “one thing”
and as such truly individual. But when we remember how far what any one
of us calls “his” inner life is from exhibiting such complete internal
coherency of structure, we shall realise that even in the highest case
the unity is still a matter of degree.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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