§ 1. The metaphysical problem of free will has been historically created by extra-ethical difficulties, especially by theological considerations in the early Christian era, and by the influence of mechanical scientific conceptions in the modern world. §§ 2, 3. The analysis of our moral experience shows that true “freedom” means teleological determination. Hence to be “free” and to “will” are ultimately the same thing. Freedom or “self-determination” is genuine but limited, and is capable of variations of degree. § 4. _Determinism_ and _Indeterminism_ both arise from the false assumption that the mechanical postulate of _causal_ determination by antecedents is an ultimate fact. The question then arises whether mental events are an exception to the supposed principle. § 5. _Determinism._ The determinist arguments stated. § 6. They rest partly upon the false assumption that mechanical determination is the one and only principle of rational connection between facts; § 7. Partly upon fallacious theories of the actual procedure of the mental sciences. Fallacious nature of the argument that complete knowledge of character and circumstances would enable us to predict human conduct. The assumed data are such as, from their own nature, could not be known _before the event_. § 8. _Indeterminism._ The psychical facts to which the indeterminist appeals do not warrant his conclusion, which is, moreover, metaphysically absurd, as involving the denial of rational connection. § 9. Both doctrines agree in the initial error of confounding teleological unity with causal determination 359 CHAPTER V SOME METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ETHICS AND RELIGION