It seems indeed as if the function of the mere intellect were always that of a necessary and valuable intermediary between a lower and a higher level of immediate apprehension. It breaks up, by the relations and distinctions it introduces, the original union of the _what_ and the _that_ of simple feeling, and proceeds to make the _what_, which it deals with in its isolation, ever more and more complex. But the ultimate issue of the process is only reached and its ultimate aim only satisfied so far as it conducts us at a higher stage of mental development to the direct intuition of a richer and more comprehensive whole in the immediate unity of its _that_ and its _what_. The besetting philosophical sin of the mere mystic is not so much his refusal to accept the work of the mere intellect as the highest and truest type of human experience, as his tendency to satisfy his demand for the fuller union of the _what_ with the _that_ by reverting to the lower forms of immediacy upon which intellectual reflection has not done its work, instead of pressing on to the higher in which the effect of that work is preserved though its form is transcended. These reflections may serve to obviate the objection that to reject the relational scheme when it is offered as the ultimate truth is to deny the value and significance of the scientific work we accomplish by means of it. Though the scheme of relations cannot adequately express the mode of union between the finite and the infinite, there is no fresh addition to the system of relations into which scientific analysis translates the real world of experience that does not increase our knowledge of what the real world must contain, though it may fail to explain how it contains it. And, in conclusion, let it be remembered that it is true not only of the religious mystic’s special experience of union with deity, but of all direct experience, that the relational scheme is quite inadequate to explain how it holds its double aspects, its unity and its multiplicity, its _that_ and its _what_, in complete interpenetration. For _no_ living experience is a mere whole of parts, and none, therefore, can be fully represented by a scheme based upon the concept of whole and part.[97] _Consult further_:—F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chaps. 1-3, 15, 27; L. T. Hobhouse, _Theory of Knowledge_, pp. 172-181 (Qualities and Relations), 540-557 (Substance); H. Lotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. i. chap. 1 (The Being of Things), chap. 2 (The Quality of Things), chap. 3 (The Real and Reality); J. Royce, _The World and the Individual_, First Series, Supplementary Essay; B. Russell, “The Concept of Order” (_Mind_, January 1901), and article on “Position in Space and Time” (_Mind_, July 1901); G. F. Stout, “Alleged Self-contradictions in the Concept of Relation” (_Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_, New Series, vol. ii. pp. 1-14, with the accompanying discussion, pp. 15-24). -----------------------