Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
§ 6. As might be expected of a postulate so obviously originated by our
practical needs, the concept of cause on examination reveals its
anthropomorphic character. This is particularly obvious when we consider
the concept of Causation as it figures in everyday unscientific thought.
The various scientific substitutes for the popular notion of cause all
exhibit traces of the endeavour to purge the conception of its more
anthropomorphic elements. In the popular use of the concept this
anthropomorphism comes out most strikingly in two ways. (_a_) A cause,
as popularly conceived, is always a person or thing, _i.e._ something we
can imagine as a whole, and into which we can mentally project a
conscious life akin to our own. To the scientific mind it seems obvious
that causes and effects are alike _events_ and events only, but for
popular thought, while the effect is always a quality or state (_e.g._,
death, fever, etc.), the cause is regularly a thing or person (the
bullet, the poison, the tropical sun, etc.).
(_b_) Closely connected with this is the emphasis popular thought lays
upon what it calls the _activity_ of the cause. The cause is never
thought of as merely preceding the effect as an “inseparable
antecedent”; it is supposed to _make_ the effect occur, to bring it
about by an exercise of activity. According to the most coherent
expositions of this type of thought, in causation one thing is always
_active_ in producing a change in another thing which is _passive_. The
origin of this notion is sufficiently obvious. As all philosophers since
Hume have recognised, the “activity” of the cause results from the
ascription to it of the characteristic feeling of self-assertion and
self-expansion which accompanies our own voluntary interference in the
course of events. Similarly, the “passivity” of the thing in which the
effect is produced is only another name for the feeling of coercion and
thwarted self-assertion which arises in us when the course of nature or
the behaviour of our fellows represses our voluntary execution of our
designs.
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