Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
Though this general caution is at least equally applicable to the
amateur excursions of the student whose mental training has been
confined to some special group of experimental sciences into the field
of metaphysical criticism, it would be a good rule for practice if every
student of Metaphysics would consider it part of his duty to make
himself something more than an amateur in at least one branch of
empirical science; probably Psychology, from its historical connection
with philosophical studies, presents unique advantages for this purpose.
And conversely, no specialist in experimental science should venture on
ultimate metaphysical construction without at least a respectable
acquaintance with the principles of Logic, an acquaintance hardly to be
gained by the perusal of Jevons’s _Elementary Lessons_ with a supplement
of Mill.
§ 2. Cosmology, then, means the critical examination of the assumptions
involved in the recognition of the physical as a distinct order of
existence, and of the most general hypotheses employed by popular
thought and scientific reflection respectively for the description of
specially physical existence. It is clear that this very recognition of
a distinction between the physical and other conceivable forms of
existence implies a degree of reflective analysis more advanced than
that embodied in the naïve pre-scientific view with which we started in
our last two chapters. In the simple conception of the world of
existence as consisting of the changing states of a plurality of
interacting things, there was not as yet any ground for a distinction
between the psychical and the purely physical. That there really exists
a widespread type of thought for which this distinction has never
arisen, is put beyond doubt by the study of the psychology of the child
and the savage. Both, as we know, draw no hard-and-fast line between the
animated and the inanimate, and the savage, in his attempts to account
for the phenomena of life, does so habitually by supposing the physical
organism to be tenanted by one or more lesser organisms of the same
order of existence. The “soul” he ascribes to things is simply a smaller
and consequently less readily perceptible body within the body.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account