Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
(_c_) Finally, chance may mean “pure” chance, the existence of something
for which there is no “ground” whatever, as it stands in no organic
interconnection with a wider system of real existence. Chance in this
last sense is, of course, absolutely excluded by our conception of the
systematic unity of the real as expressed in the principle of Ground and
Consequence, as an ultimate axiom of all consistent thought. Our denial
of the absolute validity of the principles of Causality and Uniformity
would only amount to the admission of “pure” chance into things if we
accepted those principles as necessary consequences of the axiom of
Ground and Consequence. If they are mere practical postulates, which
present the axiom of Ground under artificial restrictions for which
there is no logical justification in the axiom itself, the admission
that they are not ultimately true in no way conflicts with full
recognition of the thorough systematic unity of existence; it merely
means that the view of the nature of that unity assumed by our practical
postulates, though eminently useful, is inadequate.
We may here conveniently recapitulate our results. On metaphysical
grounds, we felt compelled to regard the physical order as the
manifestation to our special sensibility of a system of interconnected
beings with sentient and purposive experiences like ourselves. The
apparent purposelessness and deadness of the greater part of that order
we explained as intelligible on the supposition that the subjective
purposes and interests of many of its members are too unlike our own for
our recognition. We then saw that if nature consists of such sentient
experiences, the apparent domination of it by absolute law and
uniformity cannot be the final truth. Such uniformity as there is must
be approximate, and must result from our having to deal in bulk with
collections of facts which we cannot follow in their individual detail,
and will thus be of the same type as the statistical uniformities
established by the anthropological sciences in various departments of
human conduct. Next, we saw that the uniformities we call the “laws” of
nature are, in fact, of this type; that they represent average results
computed from a comparison of large collections of instances with which
we cannot, or cannot so long as we adhere to our scientific purpose,
deal individually, are only absolute while they remain hypothetical, and
never afford ground for absolute assertion as to the course of concrete
events.
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