Further, and this is a point of fundamental difference between conceptual space and time, and the spaces and times of immediate perception, any one position in either order, taken by itself, is qualitatively indistinguishable from any other. All points of space, all moments of time, are alike, or, as it is also phrased, conceptual space and time are _homogeneous_ throughout. It is not until you take at least two terms of the spatial or temporal series and consider the relation they determine, that distinction becomes possible. This homogeneity of conceptual space and time is an inevitable consequence of the abstraction from the immediate feelings of the individual subject of experience involved, as we saw, in the process of their construction. In our actual perception of spatial and temporal extension, that part of perceived space and time which stands in direct unity with immediate feeling is qualitatively distinguished as the _here_ and _now_ from all the rest, and thus does not depend upon the specification of a second spatial or temporal position for its recognisability. _Here_ is where _I_ am, _now_ is _this_ felt present. And similarly, every other part of the actually presented space and time gets a unique qualitative character from its special relation to this _here_ and _now_; it is right or left, behind or in front, before or after. When we abstract altogether from the unique relation with individual experience which thus makes the _here_ and _now_ of perception, as we do in constructing our conceptual space and time order, every position alike becomes the mere possibility of a _here_ or a _now_, and as such mere possibilities the various positions are indistinguishable. Practically, this homogeneity is important as the indispensable condition for the quantitative comparison of different portions of extension or duration.