Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
§ 1. If we are, in the end, to attach any definite intelligible meaning
to the distinction between things as they really are and things as they
merely appear to be, we must clearly have some universal criterion or
test by which the distinction may be made. This criterion must be, in
the first place, infallible; that is, must be such that we cannot doubt
its validity without falling into a contradiction in our thought; and,
in the next, it must be a characteristic belonging to all reality, as
such, and to nothing else. Thus our criterion must, in the technical
language of Logic, be the predicate of an exclusive proposition of which
reality is the subject; we must be able to say, “Only the real possesses
the quality or mark _X_.” The argument of our last chapter should
already have suggested that we have such a criterion in the principle
that “what is real is not self-contradictory, and what is
self-contradictory is not real.” Freedom from contradiction is a
characteristic which belongs to everything that is real and ultimately
to nothing else, and we may therefore use it as our test or criterion of
reality. For, as we have seen in the last chapter, it is precisely our
inability, without doing violence to the fundamental structure of our
intellect, to accept the self-contradictory as real which first leads to
the drawing of a distinction between the real and the merely apparent;
on the other hand, where we find no contradiction in thought or
experience, we have no valid ground for doubting that the contents of
our experience and thinking are truly real. In every application, even
the most simple and rudimentary, of the distinction between what really
is and what only seems, we are proceeding upon the assumption that, if
things as we find them are self-contradictory, we are not yet in
possession of the truth about them; while, on the other hand, we may
legitimately treat the results of our thinking and experience as fully
true until they are shown to involve contradiction. Thus, in setting up
the proposition “What is real is never self-contradictory” as a
universal criterion, we are only putting into explicit form, and
proposing to apply universally, a principle involved in all rational
reflection on the course of things. Audacious as the attempt to make
such a general statement about the whole universe of being appears, it
is an audacity to which we are fully committed from the first moment of
our refusing to accept both sides of a contradiction as true.
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