Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
§ 3. To return to our detailed investigation of the connection between
Reality as now defined for the metaphysician, and Experience. We can now
see more completely than before why it is only in _immediate_ experience
that reality is to be found. Our reason for identifying reality with
immediate experience has nothing to do with the theory according to
which “sensations,” being the product of a something “without the mind,”
are supposed to carry with them a direct certificate of the independent
existence of their “external” cause. For we have seen: (1) that
immediacy means simply indissoluble union with a whole of feeling, and
that this immediacy belongs to every mental state as actually lived
through; (2) that the dependence of sensations in particular on an
“external” cause, is in no sense an immediate datum of experience, but a
reflective hypothesis which, like all such hypotheses, demands
examination and justification before it can be pronounced legitimate;
(3) that it is a philosophical blunder to identify the real with the
merely “independent” of ourselves. What is merely independent, as we
have now seen, would for us be the merely unreal. Presence in immediate
experience is a universal character of all that is real, because it is
only in so far as anything is thus presented in immediate unity with the
concrete life of feeling that it can be given as a condition or fact of
which an individual interest must take account, on pain of not reaching
accomplishment. Actual life, as we have already learned, is always a
concrete unity of feeling in which the two distinguishable aspects of a
psychical fact, its existence and its content, the that and the what,
though distinguishable, are inseparable. Scientific reflection on the
given we found to be always abstract, in the sense that its very essence
is the mental separation of the content from the process. By such
separation we mediately get to know the character of the separated
content better, but our knowledge, with all its fulness, still remains
abstract; it is still knowledge referring to and about an object outside
itself. It is only when, as a result of the reflective process, we find
fresh meaning in the individual process-content on its recurrence that
we return once more to the concrete actuality of real existence.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account