Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
Now, we may express this same result in another and an even more
significant way. To say that reality is essentially one with immediate
feeling, is only another way of saying that the real is essentially that
which is of significance for the attainment of purpose. For feeling is
essentially teleological, as we may see even in the case of simple
pleasure and pain. Amid all the confusion and complexity of the
psychological problems which can be raised about these most simple forms
of feeling, one thing seems clear, that pleasure is essentially
connected with unimpeded, pain with impeded, discharge of nervous
activity. Pleasure seems to be inseparable from successful, pain from
thwarted or baffled, tendency.[33] And if we consider not so much the
abstractions “pleasure in general,” “pain in general,” as a specific
pleasure or pain, or again a complex emotional state, the case seems
even clearer. Only a being whose behaviour is consciously or
unconsciously determined by ends or purposes seems capable of finding
existence, according as those purposes are advanced or hindered,
pleasant or painful, glad or wretched, good or bad. Hence our original
decision that reality is to be found in what is immediately experienced,
as opposed to what is severed by subsequent reflective analysis from its
union with feeling, and our later statement that that is real of which
we are constrained to take account for the fulfilment of our purposes,
fully coincide.
This point may perhaps be made clearer by a concrete example. Suppose
that some purpose of more or less importance requires my immediate
presence in the next town. Then the various routes by which I may reach
that town become at once circumstances of which I have to take note and
to which I must adapt my conduct, if my important purpose is not to be
frustrated. It may be that there are alternative routes, or it may be
that there is only one. In any case, and this is fundamental for us, the
number of alternatives which my purpose leaves open to me will be
strictly limited. I can, as a matter of mere mathematical possibility,
go from A to B in an indefinite number of ways. If I have to make the
journey in actual fact on a given day, and with existing means of
transit, the theoretical infinity of possible ways is speedily reduced
to, at the outside, two or three. For simplicity’s sake we will consider
the case in which there happens to be only one available way. This one
available way is “real” to me, as contrasted with the infinity of
mathematically possible routes, precisely because the execution of my
purpose restricts me to it and no other. The mathematically possible
infinity of routes remain unreal just because they are thought of as all
alike mere possibilities; no actual purpose limits me to some one or
some definite number out of the infinity, and compels me to adapt myself
to their peculiarities or fail of my end. They are “imaginary” or
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