One falls into it sometimes simply from over-hastiness. Sometimes we are led into it through the presumptuous attachment we have for our sentiments. But the most ordinary source of this ignorance is the maliciousness which causes us to see stains and defects in persons which a single eye would never discover in them.... It causes us to feel strongly the least conjectures, and enlarges in our eyes the slightest appearances. We believe them guilty because we should be very glad if they were. The _consequences_ of rash judgments are sometimes terrible and fatal. The divisions and hatreds which disturb human society and extinguish charity come generally only from a few indiscreet words that escape us. Moreover, we do not always confine ourselves to simple judgments. We pass from the thoughts of the mind to the promptings of the heart. We conceive aversion and contempt for those we have thoughtlessly condemned, and we inspire the same sentiments in others. Rash judgments are the source of what we call _prejudices_; or, rather, prejudices are but rash judgments fixed and permanent.... We portray human beings to ourselves from the inconsiderate remarks made about them before us, and we then adjust all their other actions to the ideas we have formed of them. It serves us as a key whereby to explain the conduct of these persons, and as a rule for our conduct towards them. 3. We are apt to delude ourselves as to the motives of the judgments we pronounce. The manner in which we conceal from ourselves this defect is very delicate and very difficult to avoid. For it comes from the bad use we make of a maxim very true in itself when viewed generally, but which in private we imperceptibly pervert. This maxim is, that whilst it is forbidden to judge, it is not forbidden to see--that is to say, to give one's self up to convincing evidence. Thus, in making our judgments pass for views or evidences, we shield them from all that can be said against the rashness of our judgments. To enable us to distrust this pretended evidence, it would only be necessary to call our attention upon those whom we think guilty of rash judgments in regard to us. They think as we do, that the rashest of their judgments are from observation evidently true. Who, then, will assure us that it is different with us, and that we are the only ones free from this illusion? 4. It is maintained that one cannot help seeing the faults of others: so be it; but one need not make it voluntarily an object.