(_a_) The first is _assumed superiority_, that is to say an imperious manner in the expression of one's sentiments, and which most persons resent, as much because it shows a proud and haughty soul, as because it indicates a domineering spirit tyrannizing over minds. (_b_) The second is the decided and dogmatic manner in which an opinion is given; as if it could not be reasonably contradicted. (_c_) _Vehemence_ does not belong to the mistakes we have just spoken of. It consists in conveying the impression that one is not only attached to one's sentiments from conviction, but also passionately, which furnishes many people a reason for suspecting the truth of those sentiments, thus inspiring in them a wholly contrary feeling. (_d_) The contempt and insults which enter into disputes, are so obviously shocking, that it is not necessary to warn against them; but it may be well to remark that there are certain rudenesses and incivilities nearly akin to contempt, although they spring from another source. Change of opinion is in itself such a hard thing, and so contrary to nature, that we must not add to it other difficulties. (_e_) Finally, _hardness_, which does not so much consist in the hardness of the terms employed as in the absence of certain softening words, also often shocks those thus addressed, because it implies a sort of indifference and contempt. 2. _Passions._--It is not enough to avoid contradicting people's opinions, or to do so cautiously only; one must also spare their _inclinations_ and their _passions_, because otherwise, it is impossible to avoid complaints, murmurs, and quarrels. These inclinations are of three kinds: which may be called _just_, _indifferent_, and _unjust_. (_a_) One should never really satisfy the unjust ones; but it is not always necessary to oppose them; for it is wounding others to make one's self conspicuous without particular reason.... One must always make amends for good and evil ... especially when there are others who could do it with better results than we. Besides, "this same rule obliges us to choose the least offensive, the gentlest, the least irritating means." (_b_) I call indifferent passions those the objects of which are not bad in themselves, although they may be sought after with a vicious adhesion. Now, in this sort of things we are at greater liberty to yield to the inclinations of others: 1, because we are not their judges; 2, because we do not know whether these affections are not necessary to them (leading them away from still more dangerous objects); 3, because these sorts of affections must be destroyed with prudence and circumspection; 4, because there is reason to fear we might do them more harm in indirectly opposing their innocent passions, than we should do them good in warning them against them.