If therefore they began a forward movement on the 23rd (eighth day) the case foreseen by Moltke had arisen, and it became necessary to detrain the II. army upon the Rhine. Without waiting for further confirmation of this intelligence, Moltke, with the consent of the king, altered the arrangements accordingly, a decision which, though foreseen, exercised the gravest influence on the course of events. As it happened this decision was premature, for the French could not yet move. Supply trains had to be organized by requisition from the inhabitants, and even arms and ammunition procured for such reserves as had succeeded in joining. Nevertheless, by almost superhuman exertions on the part of the railways and administrative services, all essential deficiencies were made good, and by the 28th of July (13th day) the troops had received all that was absolutely indispensable and might well have been led against the enemy, who, thanks to Moltke's premature action, were for the moment at a very serious disadvantage. But the French generals were unequal to their responsibilities. It is now clear that, had the great Napoleon and his marshals been in command, they would have made light of the want of cooking pots, cholera belts, &c., and, by a series of rapid marches, would have concentrated odds of at least three to one upon the heads of the Prussian columns as they struggled through the defiles of the Hardt, and won a victory whose political results might well have proved decisive. To meet this pressing danger, which came to his knowledge during the course of the 29th, Moltke sent a confidential staff officer, Colonel v. Verdy du Vernois, to the III. army to impress upon the crown prince the necessity of an immediate advance to distract the enemy's attention from the I. and II. armies; but, like the French generals, the crown prince pleaded that he could not move until his trains were complete. Fortunately for the Germans, the French intelligence service not only failed to inform the staff of this extraordinary opportunity, but it allowed itself to be hypnotized by the most amazing rumours. In imagination they saw armies of 100,000 men behind every forest, and, to guard against these dangers, the French troops were marched and counter-marched along the frontiers in the vain hope of discovering an ideal defensive position which should afford full scope to the power of their new weapons. As these delays were exerting a most unfavourable effect on public opinion not only in France but throughout Europe, the emperor decided on the 1st of August to initiate a movement towards the Saar, chiefly as a guarantee of good faith to the Austrians and Italians. On this day the French corps held the following positions from right to left: 1st corps Hagenau 2nd corps Forbach 3rd corps St Avold 4th corps Bouzonville 5th corps Bitche 6th corps Chalons 7th corps Belfort and Colmar Guard near Metz