_Thesmos_ ([Greek: thesmos]), an ordinance (from the same root as themis), is not found in "Homer," except in the last line of the original form of the _Odyssey_ (xxiii. 296), where it probably refers to the "ordinance" of wedlock. The common term for law, [Greek: nomos], is first found in Hesiod, but not in a specially legal sense (e.g. _Op._ 276). The trial scene. A trial for homicide is one of the scenes represented on the shield of Achilles (_Il._ xviii. 497-508). The folk are here to be seen thronging the market-place, where a strife has arisen between two men as to the price of a man that has been slain. The slayer vows that he has paid all ([Greek: eucheto pant' apodounai]), the kinsman of the slain protests that he has received nothing ([Greek: anaineto meden helesthai]); both are eager to join issue before an umpire, and both are favoured by their friends among the folk, who are kept back by the heralds. The cause is tried by the elders, who are seated on polished stones in a sacred circle, and in the midst there lie two talents of gold, "to give to him who, among them all, sets forth the cause most rightly" ([Greek: to domen hos meta toisi diken ithyntata eipoi]). The discussions of the above passage have chiefly turned on two points: (1) the legal questions at issue; and (2) the destination of the "two talents." (1) In the ordinary view (a), it is solely a question whether the fine or blood-money, corresponding to the _Wergeld_ (see WERGELD, TEUTONIC PEOPLES, BRITAIN: _Anglo-Saxon_) of the old Germanic law (Grimm, _Rechtsalterthumer_, 661 f.), has been paid or not. (This is accepted by Thonissen, Lipsius, Sidgwick and Ridgeway.) In the other view (b), it is held that the slayer "claimed to pay" the fine, and the kinsman of the slain "refused to accept any compensation" (so Passow and Leaf, approved by Pollock). (2) The "two talents" (shown by Ridgeway to be a small sum, equal in value to two oxen) are awarded either (a) to the litigant who "pleads his cause most justly before them" (so Thonissen, Shilleto and Lipsius, in accordance with the Attic use of phrases like [Greek: diken eipein]), or (b) to the judge "who, among all the elders, gives the most righteous judgment" (so Maine, approved by Sidgwick, Pollock, Leaf and Ridgeway). On this controversy, cf. Maine's _Ancient Law_, chap. x. pp. 385 f., 405 f., ed. Pollock; Thonissen, _Droit penal_ (1875), 27; P. M. Laurence (on Shilleto's view) in _Journal of Philology_, viii. (1879), 125 f.; Ridgeway, _ib._ x. (1882), 30 f., and _Journal of Hellenic Studies_, viii. (1887), 133 f.; and Leaf, _ib._ viii. 122 f., and in his Commentary on _Iliad_, ii. (1902), 610-614; also J. H. Lipsius in _Leipziger Studien_, xii. (1890), 225-231, criticized by H. Sidgwick in _Classical Review_, viii. (1894), 1-4.